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The importance of transparency of economic activity and policy has sprung to the for front of
economic research following the recent financial and banking crises in Mexico, South East
Asia and Russia. Evidence from other countries that have experienced long period of poor
transparency and low growth rate suggest that poor transparency may have adverse affect on
long term growth as well.'
Most economic models emphasized the effect of transparency at the micro level on
firms' behavior, and at the macro level on agents response to unobserved monetary or fiscal
policy. At the micro level for example, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that managers will
borrow rather than issue equity when they have private information about the firm's profit. At
the macro level, recent attentions have been paid to the relationship between international
common lenders behavior and poor transparency. For example, Calvo (1999), Calvo and
Mendoza (1999), and Kodres and Pritsker (1998) show that costly information about
international investments can produce herding and contagion effects. Zeira (1999) shows that
poor transparency may lead to "informational overshooting" in the stock market. Honohan
(1999) presents an argument for bank contagion based on informational externalities in a
simple oligopoly model of bank lending. In his model liberalization increases the probability
of a crisis since it induce banks to shift to riskier mix of loans. The reason is that as new banks
enter unexpectedly, old banks are left with excess capacity that they lend at a higher risk, i.e.,
the value of the deposit-put increases.
This paper analyses how lack of transparency combined with new and deregulated
financial markets may lead to unsustainable investment, and large exposures and vulnerability
1of financial institutions. The reason for this outcome is the process by which new financial
markets acquire information on borrowers. Initially, when financial markets are deregulated,
banks have very limited information on specific borrowers. In addition, even if banks have the
necessary informnation  they might not have the skills to use it efficiently. Thus, banks lend
small amounts to many borrowers (i.e., credit rationing occurs as in Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981)). As a result, investment is low and inefficient, projects with high productivity get the
same amount of credit as projects with low productivity. As time passes, information on
specific projects (borrowers) is revealed and banks update their credit accordingly. They
increase credit to projects with high productivity and decrease credit to projects with low
productivity. If the economy is transparent (i.e., there is no uncertainty regarding the true
outcome of the projects) the learning process is fast and efficient in the sense that the new
information is transparent and certain, the banking system is solid. If, on the other hand,
transparency is poor in the sense that the new information is non-transparent and uncertain,
the learning process may lead to inefficient and unsustainable allocation of credit. Even
though banks adjust their belief rationally, updating their belief based on their priors and the
new information, a series of temporary shocks or non-transparent expansionary policy would
increase banks' exposure and vulnerability.
The analysis has several policy and empirical implications. The main policy
implications are as following. First, a more transparent macro economic data and government
policy, such as an increase in the transparency of fiscal, monetary and trade, would decrease
the probability of a financial crisis, especially following financial liberalization. Second,
policy makers should be very alert about credit expansions (and banks' behavior) during
periods of high economic activity, especially if they posses bad information not available to
'See Campos,  Ed, Root, Hilton L (1994)
2the public.  Third, financial  crises can occur  regardless  of financial  liberalization,  but financial
liberalization  combined  with poor transparency  increases  the probability  of a crisis.  This does
not imply  that countries  should  not liberalize  their financial  system or that financial
liberalization  always  results in a crisis.  It implies only that countries  that liberalize  their
financial  sector  should  make every effort  to increase  transparency.  Fourth,  if financial
institutions  become  vulnerable,  it is very likely  that they will rollover  bad loans and hence
their condition  is likely  to deteriorate  farther  rather than improve.  The reason is that by rolling
bad loans  over banks do not have to reduce  the book value of their capital  and consequently
other  loans.  Thus, delaying  adjustments  (e.g.,  bail out, closing  down banks)  may  be costly  in
the sense that it is likely  to increase  the magnitude  of the crises.
In order  to test whether  indeed  financial  liberalization  combined  with poor transparency
increases  the probability  of a banking  crisis  - we construct  a data set of 56 countries  from
1977  to 1997.  The empirical  results suggest  that financial  liberalization  increases  the
probability  of a crisis during  the five years  following  the liberalization.  We further  find that
the probability  of a crisis following  liberalization  is higher in countries  with poor transparency
than in countries  that are transparent.
This paper is constructed  as following.  In the next section  we present  a dynamic  model
of credit  and investment  and discuses  the role of transparency.  Section  3 discusses  how
financial  liberalization  with poor transparency  may lead  to financial  crisis  and discusses  some
policy  implications.  Section  4 presents  empirical  evidence  in support  of the model. Section  5
concludes.
32. A Simple Model of Investment with Poor Transparency
Suppose an economy with many heterogeneous projects (firms). Each project yields
different returns for the same level of investment. The return of each project increases with
the level of investment but at a decreasing rate i.e., marginal productivity is positive and
decreasing. There is a free entry to each project. If there is more than one investor in a given
project, then investors receive the average return of the project. Specifically, assume that there
is a continuum of projects, distributed uniformly along the unit interval. Let R;,  be the return
of project j.  R;,  depends on three elements - a project specific quality (productivity) 9;,  the
level of investment in the project,  Ij,  and an aggregate shock, V, that affects all projects in
the economy. V represents a productivity shock, government's policy (fiscal, monetary,
trade), and so on.
wt;(O,Ij  ,V)  .1
-R>0  aR0  a-> <  AR  >0
89  ai  829  aV
The discussion above describes investment opportunities in the economy, i.e., the
demand for credit. In the next section, we discuss the supply of funds to investors.
2.1 Financial Institutions
The supply of funds to projects is provided by financial institutions that operate in a
perfect competition environment taking the interest rate for deposits and the interest rate for
borrowers (investors) as given. Financial institutions have reserve requirements. Each
institution is required by regulators to hold equity proportional to their lending (deposits). We
4first describe the equilibrium in an economy with complete information and then discuss the
dynamics in an economy with incomplete information, i.e., poor transparency.
In an economy with complete information, the profits of a financial institution from
lending an amount I to firm j are
I(r - r),  -(2)
where r is the interest rate which financial institutions charge borrowers, and rs is the interest
rate they pay depositors (both are given to the banks). Let the equity (reserve) deposits ratio
be 8.  Thus, the required equity (reserve) is 81, and the returns for financial intermediaries
from a loan of I are
I(r  -r')  (r -r')  3
In words, the returns from lending I are equal to the interest rate spread divided by the
required equity (reserves) ratio.
Tlhe  level of investment in each project is determined by the project's  specific
productivity. Each project is financed until its returns are equal to r
R,(9;,1 1 ,Y)  (4)
Thus, the level of investment in each project depends on the project specific productivity, 9;,
the state of the aggregate economy, V, and the interest rate, r.  Assuming that the function R*
is invertible and separable, equation (4) can be solved to yield the level of investment in each
project as a function of the project specific productivity, the aggregate shock, and the interest
rate.  2
2 Note that investment in some projects may be zero.
5Ii  = g(Oj;,  V, r) . (5)
Finally, aggregate investment can be derived by aggregating over all projects in the economy,
I = J(Ij (o;,V,r)4(j)  (6)
0
Before we proceed a comment is in place. The model above makes the simplifying
assumption that the interest rates are given rather than detenmined endogenously in the model.
This assumption allows us to focus our attention on the role of transparency in a simple
framework. Specifically, to discuss the effect of poor transparency on the dynamic of credit
and the vulnerability of the financial sector. The model, however, can be extended to a
general equilibrium framework by specifying the supply of funds by depositors as a function
of the deposit's interest rate and the probability of a failure. In this case, the deposit interest
rate, the interest rate for loans and the amount of credit are determined by the market clearing
conditions: Deposits is equal to credit and banks' profits are equal to zero. Alternatively one
can view the interest rate as the world interest rate which are given to a small open economy
with government guarantees.
2.2 Lack of Transparency
Consider an economy where financial institutions have limited information about
specific projects. Assume that the financial system has been liberalized or deregulated and
financial institutions cannot distinguish between projects. The only information that is
available is that projects'  quality (returns), o;,  are drawn from a normal distribution with
unknown mean  ,u and variance of 1.
O* - N(u,  1)  6  (7)
6Even though the mean of the distribution, ji,  is unknown, financial institution have prior belief
(knowledge) that u is drawn from a normal distribution with mean a  and variance  0.2.
,u -N(a,ca')
The initial priors may be unbiased in the sense that g=ac  or may be biased if g#￿a.  Every
period new information becomes available  (in a way describe below) and the priors are
updated using bayse rule.
The aggregate shock or policy, V each period is drawn from a normal distribution with
zero mean and variance  a'  .
Vt -N(O,  o').  (8)
Further more, the realization of V by itself is never observed.
At the end of each period, the return of each project is observed. The returns, however,
are a combination of the project's  quality and the aggregate shock (or policy), V. Since V by
itself is unobserved, it is impossible to learn the quality of each project with certainty. The
new information, however, is valuable. Below we describe how the new information is used
to update the priors.
2.3 Initial Period
In the initial period, given their information set, financial institutions can not distinguish
between projects. Thus, they treat every projects as if it is a random draw from a normal
distribution with mean  a and variance of ao-(ov2,  a,2 1). Thus, they lend to all projects the
same amount depending on the required rate of return by financial institutions. Assume that
7financial institutions are risk neutral and require a return of rF. The amount of credit,
therefore, is determined such that expected return from lending is equal to rF, where
r
(1 + r) prob(Rj  (I) > r) + J(l + Rj (I)) prob(Rj (I) < r)dj - (1 + rs)
rF  =  -I  (9)
The first term is the return when the loan is repaid, that is, the probability that projects'
returns are greater than r, times the interest rate. The second termn  is the returns from projects
with returns below r, that is the probability of given returns times the return integrated over all
projects with returns below r. The third term is the interest rate paid to depositors. Equation
(9) can be solved to yield the level of investment as a function of r,  r  ,rS  and the prior belief
about the return's distribution, a  and 0C2
Ii  = T(r, rFrs  ,a  ,2  ).  (10)
The allocation of credit is inefficient. All projects receive the same amount of credit
regardless of the productivity. Projects with low productivity receive too much credit while
projects with high productivity receive too little credit.
2.4 Proceeding periods
At the end of each period, the returns from each project are realized. Banks observe
Rj (O;, Ij ,V)  but not  9,;  or V separately. In other words, banks can not distinguish between
the case where projects have high productivity and the economy had a bad shock (cc  is high
and V is negative) and the case where projects have low productivity and the economy had a
positive shock (ax  is low and V is positive).
8The dynamics  of investment  (credit) depends  on the updating  of the information  which
in turns depend  on the priors and the realizations  of V. For simplicity,  assume that banks
observe 0'  +  V (e.g.,  the function R is linear  in  9.  and V). At the initial period,  the prior
belief  is that u - N(a,  o2 ). At the end of the period,  the observed  returns have a mean equal
to  7  + V where 9 =  6j  . Therefore,  the new information  about pt  is
UN -N(9,cr  )  (11)
Furthermore,  banks observe  the firm's location  relative  to other  firms.  Thus, one can use
bayesian  inference  to update  the priors using  the new information  to forms new belief about
project  j productivity  (return),











If the priors are very uncertain,  i.e.,  a2  is large,  then the posterior  belief depends  mainly  on
the new information.  On the other hand, if the priors are certain,  i.e.,  a,  = 0, then the new
information  allows  us to distinguish  between  the firms  but the belief about  the mean
productivity  is unchanged.
9At the beginning  of the next period credit  is allocated  according  to the new priors and
the situation  repeats  itself. At the end of the period 9=  =,  - V is observed  and the priors are
updated.  Specifically,  the priors are that
P-N(aN,aN  )
and the new information  is that
'UN - N(O,  ' ) .
Thus, the priors are updated using the bayesian  rule above  and the situation  then repeats  itself
(given  the new priors, lending  decisions  are made.  At the end of the period, a = u - V  is
observed  and the priors are updated  accordingly).
Finally,  one can calculate  the dynamics  of investment  from the evolution  of beliefs.
Credit  to project  j is such that the expected  return  of the financial  institution  from investing  in
project  j is equal to r
(I +r) prob(Rj  (I)  2r)  +  Jf(I + Rj (I)) porb(Rj (I) < r)dj-  (I  +  r s
r  =  . (13)
Equation  (13) yields the level of investment  in each  project  as a function  of r, rF, rS 9  ,
and the information  set,
I  =g(r,r  vrs,  O8r  j  0 ,.av  )  (14)
Aggregate  investment  then could  be calculated  simply  by aggregating  (14) over all projects.
3. Exposures, Vulnerability and Transparency
10In this section we discuss two issues. First, we describe how a country can become
exposed and vulnerable when financial institutions follow a rational policy as described
above. Second, we describe the conditions under which banks would choose to rollover loans
to unprofitable projects, and hence delay the adjustment and increase the probability and
magnitude of a crisis.
Consider an economy with very uncertain priors that has experienced a success of
positive aggregate shocks or expansionary government policy (notice that these shocks do not
necessarily have to increase over time). As a result, financial institutions have updated their
prior upward above the real productivity of each project. Note that it does not require the
priors to be incorrect. It only requires some level of uncertainty. In economies with certain
priors,  a  z 0, the updating process is very slow and hence the financial system is very
unlikely to get exposed. On the other hand, in economies with uncertain priors, large  ca  , the
adjustment is fast, and hence the financial system is more likely to become vulnerable.
Consider now the banks' response when they realize that firms' productivity is below
their expectation (suppose due to a negative realization of V). The response depends on the
extent of the losses, on future expectations, and on the financial regulations (e.g., the required
equity ratio or the ability to hide bad loans). Banks can either declare the losses and adjust the
lending according to the new information, or role the loans over and hide the losses. On the
one hand, if a bank declare its losses, it can adjust its lending according to the new
information. On the other hand, if the banks roles its loans over, it does not have to decrease
its equity, but it can not adjust its loans efficiently according to the new information.
Specifically banks'  losses (profits) for a given realization, V, and for a given prior are
11c =  |((l + (Rj(Ij  / priors)  I V) - (l + rs))Ijd(j)  (15)
The first term represents the returns over all projects. The returns are a function of the
realization, V, and the lending amount to each project. The second term is the interest paid to
depositors.
For simplicity suppose that banks can either declare all the losses, c, or role over all its
loans. Bank will choose to role over all the loans if
r
((I +  r) prob(Rj(I.j-l)  > r / new  inf.) + J(1  +  Rj(I; - 1) <  r) porb(Rj(Ij,)  / new inf.)dj - (1  +  rs)  I
r,  <  - I_
a  -c
(16)
In words, if a bank declares its losses and adjusts its loans, its new equity is 51 - c and the
expected return is r F  (bI - c) . On the other hand, if the banks role the loan over its returns are
given in the nominator. If the gains from rolling the loans over amd  "having" higher equity are
greater than the losses from not adjusting the credit, the bank will role the loans over. Note,
however, that given the updating process, banks are likely overestimating the firms' quality
and hence are more exposed than they estimate. Hence, delaying the adjustment may increase
the banks' losses and vulnerability.
4. Empirical and Policy Implications
Policy Implications
The theoretical analysis has several policy and empirical implications. The main policy
implications are as following. First, an increase in transparency decreases the probability of a
12banking  crisis.  Better transparency  decreases  the probability  of banks confusing  transitory
shock  or expansionary  government  policy  with firms' productivity  and  hence decreases  the
probability  of a crisis. Second,  one should  be very alert  to the conditions  of the banking sector
following  liberalization  and an expansionary  period,  especially  if it (e.g.,  the government)
possesses  information  not available  to the public.  Third, if financial  institutions  become
vulnerable,  it is very likely  that the situation  will deteriorate  rather than improve.  In other
words, even  if bank equity  is large enough  such  that there is no moral hazard  problem,
financial  institutions  may still decide  to role loans  to bad projects.  Moreover,  banks may
underestimate  their vulnerability.  Thus, delaying  the financial  adjustment  (e.g., declaring
losses and adjusting  the loans) may  be very costly in the sense  that it will increase  the
probability  and magnitude  of a crisis.
Empirical  Implications
The analysis  has several  econometrics  implications  that we test in the following  section.
The model  implies  that poor transparency  by itself does not increase  the probability  of a
crisis.  However,  poor transparency,  combined  with uncertain  priors (such as in new
deregulated  financial  markets)  increases  the probability  of a crisis.  That is to say that  the fact
that some  countries  with poor  transparency  have not experienced  a crisis  while other  with
better  transparency  have does not imply that poor  transparency  has no effect on the
probability  of a crisis. Our econometric  investigation  therefore  has two parts.  First, we test
whether  the probability  of a crisis increases  after financial  liberalization  takes place. Second,
we test whether  the probability  of a crisis depends  on the combination  of financial
liberalization  and poor transparency.
134.1. Data and Estimation
There are several empirical studies that estimate the causes of financial crises using
macro and financial variables. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) investigate a data set of 20
countries between 1970 and mid 1995 and show that the increase in growth domestic credit
two years ago, which they argue is a proxy for financial liberalization, can help explain
banking crises. Caprio (1999) argues that "premature liberalization could be cited in virtually
all cases" of financial crises. Demirguc Kunt and Deteragiache (1 998b) estimate the
probability of a banking crisis using a data set of 53 countries between 1980 and 1995. They
identify several macro, financial, and institutional variables that explain the probability of a
crisis. They argue that the banking crises are more likely to occur in liberalized financial
system. While these findings are consistent with our model, the model's predictions are more
settled. The model's two econometric predictions are as following. First, banking crises are
more likely to occur in the period following financial liberalization, and not in any liberalized
financial system as argued by Demirguc Kunt and Deteragiache (controlling for the fact that
by definition banking crisis cannot occur in countries without financial system). The reason is
that in established financial system the priors are very certain and hence the adjustment is
very slow while in recently liberalized financial system the priors are very uncertain and
hence the adjustment is very fast. The second prediction is that the probability of a financial
crisis is higher in the period following liberalization in countries with poor transparency. The
reason is that poor transparency increases the probability of confusing firms'  quality on the
one hand with aggregate shock and non-transparent policy on the other hand.
14In order to test these predictions we constructed a data set of 56 countries between 1977
and 1997. In addition to financial liberalization and transparency variables, which we describe
below, the data set includes macroeconomic and financial variables that are identified by
Demirguc Kunt and Deteragiache (1998b) as increasing the probability of a financial crisis.
The macroeconomic variables are: GDP growth rate, inflation rate, change in terms of trade,
real interest rate, and exchange rate depreciation rate. The financial variables are: M2 to gross
international reserve ratio, claims on private sector as percent of GDP, bank liquid reserves to
bank assets ratio and real credit growth two years ago. The source of the data is the
International Financial Statistics and the World Bank GDF & WDI.
Data on financial liberalization episodes are based mainly on Williamson and Mahar
(1998), Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996), and Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998). Williamson
and Mahar survey 51 financial liberalization episodes in 28 countries between 1977 and 1994,
Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal survey 6 financial liberalization episodes in 3 countries, and Drees
and Pazarbasioglu survey 4 financial liberalization episodes in 2 countries between 1986 and
1992. Data on banking crises are constructed based on the data and description in Lindgren,
Garcia, and Saal (1996) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)3. Since the crises may
affect the macroeconomic variables, we delete the five years following the crises. If the crisis
lasts longer than five years, we drop the observations while the crisis lasts.4
Table 1 presents the countries in our sample, the periods and types of financial
liberalization, and the periods of banking crises. The financial liberalization varies in their
scope and magnitude. Some liberalization episodes were a move from very control financial
3We  drop  three countries,  Guyana,  Papua  New Guinea,  and Zaire in our regression  estimations  because  of lack
of macro/financial  data. Therefore,  there are 89 financial  liberalization  and 57 banking  crises from 56 countries
in the final sample.
4 The results  are robust  to these specifications.
15sector to a partial liberalized financial sector, while some were a slhift  from partial
liberalization to full liberalized financial sector. Some financial liberalization were taken at a
very slow rate while others were taken at very rapid rate. Due to the data limitations we do not
distinguish between the degree of liberalization, and consider all liberalization episodes the
same. 5
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics about liberalization and banking crises.
There are 92 episodes of liberalization in our sample and 60 episodes of banking crises. 36 out
of the 60 (60 percent) crises were preceded by liberalization in the previous 5 years. 15 crises
occurred before liberalization and 9 occurred more than 5 years after stabilization. Out of the
92 episodes of financial liberalization, 40 (44 percent) were followed by banking crisis in the
next 5 years. Figure 1 presents the distribution of the duration between crises and
liberalization for those crises that were preceded by liberalization. Out of 36 crises that
occurred in the 5 years following liberalization, 13 occurred 2 years after liberalization, 9
crises occurred 3 years after liberalization, and 5 crises occurred 4 years after stabilization.
4.2. Estimation results
Our first goal is to test whether banking crises are more likely to occur in the period
following liberalization. In order to relate our finding to the existing empirical findings and as
a robustness check, we first present the results from a probit estimation based on the same
countries and definition of financial liberalization and crises as Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998b). The only additional variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of
5 The results,  however,  are robust  to distinguishing  between  a move from  controlled  economy  to partial
liberalization  and a move from partial liberalization  to fall liberalization
161 if financial liberalization had occurred in the previous 5 years and 0 otherwise.6 To ease
interpretations, we report the effects of one-unit changes in the dependent variables on the
probability of a crisis (expressed in percentage points) evaluated at the mean value of the data.
We also report the associated z-statistics that test the null hypothesis of no effect.
The first column in table 3 presents results of a probit model where the dependent
variable takes the value of 1 during years with a financial crises and 0 otherwise (excluding 5
years after the crises starts or while the crises last). The macroeconomic variables have the
expected signs and are significant except for the growth rate of terms of trade and the claims
of the private sector as a share of GDP. In this specification, the probability of a crisis
increases both in the 5 years following liberalization and in liberalized financial systems.
These results, however, are very sensitive to the sample and the definition of financial
liberalization. In the second column we report the results excluding Turkey7. The results now
are very different. The probability of a crisis is higher only during the 5 years following
liberalization and there is no evidence that the probability of a crisis is higher in liberalized
financial system.
The evidence is even stronger once we use date of financial liberalization based on
Williamson and Mahar (1998) and Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998) surveys (see table 1).
Column 3 reports the results (including Turkey) using the adjusted dates of financial
liberalization. The coefficients of the financial liberalization dummy variable is insignificant
(and negative) while the coefficients of the dummy variable for the 5 years period following a
financial liberalization variable is significant and positive. Thus, there is supporting evidence
6 The results  are simialir  when  we use other  definition  such as 3 years  period instead  of 5 years.
7 One reason  to exclude  Turkey  is that  Turkey  had additional  banking  crises during  1980-95,  but these crises
were not included  in their panel because  of missing  data.
17that countries that liberalized in the last 5 years have higher probability of a crisis. There is no
evidence that liberalized financial system increases the probability of a crisis.
Finally, in the fourth column we present the results using our complete data set. 8 The
results are consistent with the previous findings. Using this specification, the probability of a
banking crisis in countries that have had financial liberalization in the past 5 years is higher
by almost 9%.
To conclude, the results provide support to the model's prediction that the probability of
a crisis is higher following a financial liberalization. There is little evidence that banking
crisis is more likely to occur in liberalized financial system after controlling for the period
following the liberalization.
4.3. Transparency
In this section we turn to test whether the increase in the probability of a crisis depends
on transparency as the model predicts. That is, do countries that liberalize their financial
sector are more likely to have a banking crisis if transparency is poor? One difficulty in
carrying out this test is that it is hard to find a good data about transparency. Thus, we use
three different measures to construct proxies for transparency. First, we use an index of
corruption as a proxy for transparency. The source of the corruption index is Political Risk
Services, Syracuse, New York (ICRG indices). The index ranges from 0 to 6, where highly
corrupted countries take a value 6 while non-corrupted countries take a value of 0. Using this
index we create a transparency dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the corruption
8 Our sample  has six more  countries:  Argentina,  Brazil,  United  Kingdom,  Nepal, Singapore,  and South  Africa.
18index is greater than or equal to 3, (which is about the median), and a value of 0 if the index
takes a value less than 3.9
Second we use a combination of the size of the public sector and corruption to create a
variable of transparency. Kopits and Craig (1998) argue that the transparency in government
behavior is reflected mainly in the structure and functions of the public sector, such as
financing operations. Thus, we create a measure of public sector size as the ratio of credits
directed to the government and the public sectors relative to total domestic.'0 We define
country with large (small) public sector if the share is greater (smaller) than the median. We
combined this measure with our measure of corruption and define three levels of
transparency. Poor transparency if a country is corrupt and has large public sector; Medium
transparency if a country is corrupt but has a small public sector or is not corrupt but has a
large public sector; Good transparency is a country, which  is not corrupt and has a small
public sector.
One caveat of using corruption as a proxy for transparency is that corruption by itself
may affect the probability of a crisis. Financial liberalization may offer new opportunities for
corruption that may lead to banking crisis. Thus, transparency may not affect banking crisis
but corruption does. In order to test and address this issue, we use another proxy for
transparency that is not based on corruption. Our third measure of transparency is from the
World Competitiveness Yearbook. The variable is based on a survey of executives in 46
countries who were asked to state whether they agree or disagree to the following statement
"the government does not communicate its policy intentions clearly". The variable takes
values from 1, agree, to 8, disagree. Unfortunately, this data is available only for 1998. Thus,
9  The results  are robust  to the exact  definition.
The data is taken  from IFS. The ratio is (line 32an + 32b + 32bx  + 32c)  /  line  32.
19we assume (quite heroically) that the level of transparency across countries has not changed
significantly during our sample.
Table 4 presents the effect of transparency on the probability of a financial crisis. In the
first column we test whether poor transparency by itself increases the probability of a crisis,
i.e., whether countries with poor transparency are more likely to have banking crises. Thus,
we add transparency, using the corruption proxy described above as an explanatory variable,
to the probit model in the previous section. The coefficient on transparency variable is
insignificant and hence there is no evidence that poor transparency (i.e. corruption) increases
the probability of a crisis.
Next we turn to test whether poor transparency increases the probability of a crisis in
the period following financial liberalization as the model predicts. We interact the
transparency dummy variable with the dummy variable of financial liberalization in the
previous 5 years. That is, we create two dummy variables: One dummy takes value of one if
there was a financial liberalization in the previous 5 years and transparency is poor, and zero
otherwise. The other dummy takes value of one if there was a financial liberalization in the
previous 5 years and transparency is good, and zero otherwise.  Che  results are presented in the
second column in table 4. Financial liberalization increases the probability of a crisis
regardless of the level of transparency. However, much more so in countries with poor
transparency. The probability of a crisis in countries with poor transparency that undertake
financial liberalization is higher by 10 percent compare to countries with good transparency
(21.89 compare to 11.55). The coefficients of the two dummies are significantly different at
14% confidence level.
20The results using our second  definition  of transparency  are presented  in the third
column.  The results are consistent  with the findings  above. The increase  in the probability  of a
crisis  following  financial  liberalization  decreases  with the level of transparency  (17.37, 12.73
and 6.66 for poor, medium  and high transparency  respectively).
Using  the third definition  of transparency  does not change  the results significantly.  In
table 5 we present  the results using the direct  measure  of transparency  in our probit
estimation.  In the first column  we test whether  transparency  increases  the probability  of a
crises.  We find no evidence  that lack of transparency  increases  the probability  of a crisis. The
coefficient  on transparency  is insignificant.  In the second  column  we test whether  lack of
transparency  increases  the probability  of a banking  crisis following  financial  liberalization  by
adding  an interaction  of financial  liberalization  in the past 5 years dummy  with the level of
transparency.  Consistent  with our findings  in table 4 we find that the interaction  term is
significant  and positive,  i.e., that countries  that are non transparent  are more likely  to have a
banking  crisis  following  financial  liberalization  than countries  that are transparent.  Finally,  as
robustness  test we present  the results using lag values of the macro and financial  variables.
One could  argue that using lags is better specification  since  banking  crises affects  the macro
and financial  variables  at the same  period.  Since our focus here is the effects  of liberalization
and  transparency  and not the effects  of macro and financial  variables  we present  the results
only as a robustness  test to the effects  of liberalization  and transparency  on the probability  of
a crisis and not investigate  this further.  The results  are presented  in the last columns  in table 4
and 5. The effects  of financial  liberalization  and transparency  are again robust  to the lagged
specification.  The effects of macro  and financial  variables,  however,  are not robust  to the
lagged  specification.
215. Conclusions
The main conclusion  of the analyses  is that the probability  of a banking crisis  is higher
during  the period of transition  when the prior information  set is uncertain.  One such case of
transition  is when countries  undertake  financial  liberalization.  We show  that the probability  of
a banking  crisis is higher in the short period following  the financial  liberalization.
Furthermore,  we show  that the increase  in the probability  of a crisis is much higher  in
countries  with poor transparency.
It is important,  however,  to note that this does  not mean ttiat countries  should  not
liberalize  their financial  sector.  Rather,  the lesson  is that countries  should  be more  transparent,
especially  during  a period of transition.  In this sense,  it is better  to liberalize  the financial
system  slowly  in countries  with poor transparency  so banks have more  time to get information
and update  their belief.
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24Table  1:  Financial  Liberalization  and Banking  Crises
COUNTRY  FINANCIAL  LIBERALIZATION  1973-1998  CRISES
USA  Abolition of capital controls in 1973*.  1984-1991
Deregulation of interest rates and credit controls from  1,395 banks were
1982*. Interstate  banking  regulations  eased in  1995.  closed
Great  Liberalized foreign exchange purchases from 1973*.  1973-1975
Britain  Reserve assets ratio abolished in 1981* and banks were  Secondary Banking
allowed to compete with building societies for housing  Crisis
finance after 1981. London stock exchange was fully
liberalized  in 1985.
Belgium  Financial markets partly liberalized by 1977*. Capital  No major crisis
controls were eased in 1986* with the adoption of the
EEC Program.
Denmark  Restrictions on purchase of foreign securities and on  1987-1991
direct investments were eased in 1983*. In 1985*
further  liberalization  measures  were adopted.
France  Interest rates (except those on subsidized loans) freed  1991-1995
in 1984*.  Large losses by
Universal banks permitted in 1985*. Financial  banks, especially by
institutions became less specialized by mid-1980s and  Credit Lyonnais
capital controls started to be lifted. Several French
banks were privatized in 1987 and Banque de France
was privatized  in  1993.
Germany  Capital controls dismantled, foreign banks pernitted  1977-1979
and interest rates were freely market-determined from  Giroinstitutions faced
1973*. Stock market regulations were eased in 1980*.  problems
Italy  Credit ceilings eliminated in 1983* (although re-  1990-1994
imposed temporarily between 1986 and 1987). Reserve  58 banks were in
requirements were lowered between 1988* and 1994.  difficulties
Foreign banks were permitted in 1993 as well as some
privatization  of state-owned  banks.
Netherlands  The financial sector was partly liberalized by 1977*. In  No major crisis
1983* all restrictions on capital controls were lifted. In
1986 all restrictions on capital outflows were
abolished.
Norway  Interest rate controls were removed in 1985*. In 1987  1987-1993
supplementary reserve requirements were removed.  Heavy losses and
Foreign exchange controls were removed in 1989*.  insolvencies
Sweden  Ceilings on interest rates for private sector bonds were  1990-1993
lifted in 1980*. Also, foreigners were allowed to hold  18% of total bank
Swedish shares in the same year. In 1985 ceilings on  loans were reported
bank loan rates were abolished. Foreign exchange  lost
controls  were  lifted in 1989*.
Switzerland  The financial sector was largely liberalized by 1977*.  No major crisis
25Canada  Financial sector was largely liberalized during thie  1983-1985
period examined. In 1980* foreign banks were  15 members of the
permitted, although with some regulations. Reserve  Canadian Deposit
requirements were eliminated in the early 1990s.  Insurance
Corporation failed
Japan  Controls on capital inflows and interest rate regualations  1991-1997
were eased from 1979*. Controls on capital outflows
eased in the 1986*. The requirements of bank
specialization were reduced by 1993. Further
liberalization to be implemented by 2001.
Finland  Regulations on bank lending rate were abolished in  1991-1993
1986*. In 1986 exchange control regulations were  Liquidity crisis in
lifted on long-term foreign borrowing. Cross border  1991
capital movements were liberalized in 1991*.
Greece  The process of liberalization of capital movements  1991-1995
started in 1987* with the adoption of the EEC Program.
Abolition of exchange rate controls in 1994*.
Ireland  Restrictions on acquirement of foreign securities were  1985
eased in 1979*. Restrictions on long-terms capit;al
outflows were eased in 1988*. Regulations on
exchange control were lifted in 1993.
Austria  Interest rate liberalized in 1980*
Portugal  Controls on purchases of foreign securities were  1986-1989
relaxed in 1989*. In 1992* regulations on exchange
control were lifted.
Turkey  Interest rate ceilings on loans and deposits eliminated  1982-1985
in 1980*. Direct credit was phased out in 1988. Capital  five banks were




Australia  Deposit rate controls lifted in 1980*. Capital account  1989-1990
liberalized in 1984. Most loan-rate ceilings abolished in  government
1985. Capital markets deregulated in 1986*.  intervention to cover
bank losses
New  Foreign exchange controls removed in 1984*. Initerest  1987-1990
Zealand  rates controls eliminated in 1985* as well as
requirements for financial institutions to purchase
government securities. Stock exchange was liberalized
inl 986.
South Africa  Interest rate controls and credit ceilings were removed  1977
in 1980*. Restrictions on bank competition were  1985
eliminated and new banks were allowed in 1984*.
Argentina  Credit controls were initially removed in 1977* but re-  1980-1982
imposed in 1981. The initial liberalization of 1977 was  168 banks closed
reversed in 1982. Deposit rates were freed in 1987*.  down
26Credit controls were substantially reduced in 1993*.  1989-1990
bank failure
accounted for 40% of
financial system
assets
Brazil  Interest rate ceilings removed in 1976 and re-imposed  1994-1997
in 1979. Deposit rates were fully liberalized in 1989*.  29 banks subjected to
Entry barriers reduced after 1991. Controls on capital  intervention
inflows were strengthened while controls on outflows
were loosened in the 1990s.
Chile  Commercial bank interest rates were liberalized in  1981-1983
1974. New foreign banks admitted in 1977*.Capital  bank failures
controls were gradually eased since 1979. Controls
were re-imposed in 1982 and eased again in 1985*.
Colombia  Deposit rates were market-determined in 1980*. The  1982-1987
remaining controls on interest rates were lifted by  central bank
1994*. The large capital inflows in the early 1990s led  intervened to rescue
to the re-imposition of reserve requirements on foreign  commercial banks
loans in 1993 after having been relaxed in 1991.
Ecuador  Interest rate liberalized in 1986*.  1995
Guatemala
Guyana  Interest rate liberalized in 1991*.  1993-1995
Honduras  Interest rate liberalized in 1990*.
Jamaica  Interest rate liberalized in 1991  *.  1994-1995.
Mexico  Deposit and loan rates liberalized in 1989*.  1982
Government gave discretion over foreign direct  1995
investment  in 1972. Portfolio flows were decontrolled  Accumulated losses
even further in 1989. National banks were privatize in  estimated at 12-15%
1992* and the entry of new banks was permitted.  of GDP
Paraguay  Capital controls were removed in 1988*. Foreign  1995
exchange controls were liberalized in 1993*.  government
intervention
Peru  Capital controls and interest rate controls were  No major crisis
removed in 1991*. Subsidized lending was eliminated
in 1992*
El Salvador  Interest rate liberalized in 1991*.  1989
Uruguay  Interest rate liberalized in 1980*.  1981-1985
Venezuela  Reserve requirements were reduced in the early 1990s.  1994
Interest rate controls and foreign exchange controls  Insolvent banks
were liberalized in 1991*.  accounted for 30% of
financial system
deposits
Israel  Restrictions on investment were eased in 1987* and  1983-1984
restrictions on capital flows started to be eased.  nationalization of the
Subsidized interest rates on priority lending was phased  major banks
out in 1991  *. Directed-credit system was abolished in
271990.  _  __
Jordan  Interest rate liberalized in 1988*.  1989-1990
Egypt  Interest rates and foreign exchange controls were lifted  1981-1983
in 1991  *.Ceilings on credit to private sector were lifted  1990-1991
too. Foreign banks were permitted to conduct business
in foreign currency in 1992*.
Syria
Sri Lanka  The exchange rate was unified in 1978. Capital  1989-1993
controls on inflows of capital were eased in 1978*.  nationalization of the
Foreign banks were permitted since 1979.Restrictions  major banks
on capital outflows remain.
India  Partially liberalized in 1992*.  1991-1995
Indonesia  Most deposit and loan rates were freed in 1983."'  The  1992-1998
monopoly of state-owned banks over the deposits of
state-owned enterprises were removed in 1989*, New
foreign banks were allowed to establish joint ventures
in 1988.
Korea  Controls on outward and inward foreign investmnent  1985-1986
were gradually eased since 1983*.
Malaysia  Interest rates and capital accounts were liberalized by  1985-1988
1978.*Controls on interest rates were then re-imposed
in 1985 and completely eliminated in 1992*.
Nepal  Interest rates were liberalized by 1989*.  1988-1994
Papua New  Interest rate liberalized in 1980*  1989-1995
Guinea
Philippines  Interest rates controls mostly phased out over 1981*-  1981-1987
85. Direct credit partly abolished in 1983. Restrictions  banks accounting for
on all current and capital transactions eliminated over  1.6% of the banking
1992-1995. Restrictions on foreign-bank branch:ing  system failed in 1981
lifted in 1994*.
Singapore  Financial sectors largely liberalized by 1977*.  1982
Exchange and capital controls were freed  in 1978*.
Thailand  Restrictions on inwards long-term investments were  1983-1987
eased in 1985*. Direct credit was gradually eliminated  15% of bank assets
after 1980. Foreign banks were permitted in 1990.  were non-performing
Ceilings on loan rates were removed in 1992*.




Nigeria  Interest rate liberalized in 1990*.  1991-1995
Tanzania  Controls on interest rates were eased in 1986*.  1988-1994
Exchange controls were abolished in 1992*.  state-owned
J commercial banks
28were insolvent
Togo  Interest rate liberalized in 1993*.  1993-1995
Uganda  Interest rate liberalized in 1991  *.  1994
Zaire  Interest rate liberalized in 1980*.  1991-1995
Zambia  Limits on remittances of profits and dividends were  1995
eased in 1990*. Exchange controls were abolished and
interest rates were liberalized in December  1993*.
* presents the year of financial liberalization in our data set.
Sources on financial liberalization:
- Pill, H., Pradhan, M. "Financial Indicators and Financial Change in Africa and Asia". IMF
Working Paper No. 95/123. Washington D.C.: November 1995. (for Kenya, Tanzania and
Zambia).
- Demirguc, Asli and Enrica Detraagiache, "Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility."
IMF working paper;  WP/98/83, June 1998 (for Austria, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras,
Jamaica, El Salvador, Uruguay, Jordan, Papua New Guinea, Nigeria, Togo, Uganda, and
Zaire)
- Drees, B., Pazarbasioglu, C. "The Nordic Banking crises. Pitfalls in Financial
Liberalization?". IMF Occasional Paper No. 161. Washington D.C.: April 1998 (for Sweden,
Norway and Finldnd).
- Bakker, A. 1996. "The Liberalization of Capital Movements in Europe". The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers (for Belgium, The Netherlands, Greece, Ireland and Portugal).
- Lindgren, C., Garcia, G., Saal, M. 1996. "Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy".
IMF. Washington D.C. (for Paraguay)
- Williamson, J., Mahar, M. 1998. "A Survey on Financial Liberalization". Essays in
International Finance No. 211. International Finance Section (for Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, The Philippines, Singapore,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, USA, and Venezuela).
Sources on Banking Crisis:
- Caprio, G., Klingebiel, D. 1996. "Bank Insolvencies. Cross country Experience" Policy
Research Working Paper No. 1620. World Bank. (for Australia, New Zealand, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru,  Venezuela, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Kenya, Zambia).
- Demirguc, Asli and Enrica Detraagiache, "Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility."
IMF working paper;  WP/98/83, June 1998 (for Austria, Thailand, Togo, and Uganda)
- Drees, B., Pazarbasioglu, C. 1998. "the Nordic Banking Crisis: Pitfalls in Financial
Liberalization?". IMF Occasional Paper No. 161. (for Norway, Sweden, Finland).
- Lindgren, C., Garcia, G., Saal, M. 1996. "Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy".
IMF. Washington D.C. (for Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, El Salvador, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania,
Turkey, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, and Zaire).
29Table 2:  Banking Crises and Financial Liberalization
Total Number of Banking Crisis  60
Prior to the financial liberalization  15
Five years after liberalization  36
More than five years after liberalization  9
Total Number of Liberalization  92
Number of liberalization which did not have a crisis in the next 5 years  52
Number of liberalization which had a crisis in the next 5 years  40
Figure 1: Duration Between Liberalization and a Crisis






0~  ~  ~  ~~~~3Table  3:  Probit Estimates: Financial  Liberalization
Dependent  Variable:  Bankingf crisis
Excluding
Turkey
Exolanatory  dF/dX  dF/dX  dF/dX  dF/dX
Variables  (z-statistics)  (z-statistics)  (z-statistics)  (z-statistics)
GDP growth  -0.54***  -0.48***  -0..41***  -0.40***
(4.21)  (-3.83)  (4.10)  (4.07)
Terms  of Trade Growth  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02
(0.44)  (-0.41)  (-0.49)  (-0.42)
Real Interest  Rate  0.03**  0.04**  0.04***  -0.01
(2.30)  (2.27)  (2.61)  (-0.29)
Inflation  Rate  0.04**  0.03  0.03**  0.00
(2.38)  (1.18)  (2.02)  (-0.24)
M2/Foreign  Exchange  Reserves  0.09  0.08  0.08*  0.06
(1.45)  (1.41)  (1.73)  (1.30)
Private  Credit  as % ofGDP  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01
(0.88)  (0.95)  (0.59)  (0.47)
Bank Cash  and Reserves/Assets  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  -0.01
(-1.10)  (-0.82)  (-1.08)  (-0.58)
2 Period  Lagged  Credit Growth  0.07**  0.08***  0.06**  0.045*
(2.44)  (2.61)  (2.33)  (1.85)
GDP  per Capita  -0.00**  -0.00**  -0.00*  -0.00*
(-2.39)  (-2.18)  (-1.90)  (-1.90)
Financial  Liberalization  2.37  1.29  -0.58
(1.59)  (0.83)  (-0.38)
Financial  Liberalization  in the past  2.43  3.65*
3 years  with D & D dates 2 (1.46)  (1.89)
Financial  Liberalization  in the past  9.31***  8.60***
5 years with our dates  (3.20)  (5.06)
Number of Observations  632  624  632  728
Log likelihood  -87  -82  -81  -89
***Significant at 1%
**Significant at 5 %
* Significant at 10%
'Significant  at 6 %
2 The  financial  liberalization  dates  are  taken  from  Denmirguc-Kunt  and  Detragiache,  1998a.
31Table 4:  Probit Estimates : Financial Liberalization and Transparency (1)
Dependent Variable: Bank Crisis
Measure  1  Measure  2  1 period  Lagged
Corruption Public  sector Macro  and
index 1"  involvementl 2 Financial  Var.
Explanatory  dF/dX  dF/dX  dF/dX  dF/dX
Variables  (z-statistics) (z-statistics)  (z-statistics)  (z-statistics)
GDP growth  -1.09***  -1.03***  -1.00***  0.03
(-4.55)  (-4.55)  (-4.09)  (1.12)
Tenns of Trade Growth  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.07
(0.19)  (0.11)  (0.32)  (0.58)
Real Interest  Rate  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
(0.78)  (0.76)  (1.05)  (-0.10)
Inflation  Rate  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01
(-0.49)  (-0.38)  (-0.55)  (0.21)
M2/Foreign  Exchange  Reserves  0.18  0.18  0.13  0.19
(1.61)  (1.58)  (1.03)  (1.26)
Private  Credit  as % of GDP  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.03
(1.50)  (1.35)  (1.31)  (0.60)
Bank Cash  and Reserves/Assets  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.06
(0.74)  (0.58)  (0.48)  (0.73)
2 Period  Lagged  Credit Growth  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.01
(-0.23)  (-0.27)  (-0.12)  (0.57)
GDP per Capita  -0.00*  -0.00*  -0.00*  0.00
(-1.88)  (-1.90)  (-1.91)  (-1.48)
Transparency  0.99
(0.42)
Financial  Liberalization  in the previous  13.82***
5 years  (5.53)
Poor Transparency  * Fin Liberalization  21.89***
in the previous 5 years  (5.29)
Transparency  * Fin Liberalization  in  11.55***
the previous  5 years  (3.52)
High Transparency  6.66**  6.90*
(1.86)  (1.77)
Medium  Transparency-  12.73***  10.43**
(3.04)  (2.47)
Poor Transparency  17.37**  13.84*
(1.94)  (1.70)
Number  of Observations  665  677  677  644
Log Likelihood  -151  -154  -165  -174
***Significant at 1%
**Significant at 5 %
* Significant at 10%
"Data source  Political  risk  services  of ICRG.
12 Index  constructed  using  International  Financial  Statistics,  see details  in the  text.
32Table 5:  Probit Estimates:  Financial Liberalization and Transparency (2)
Dependent Variable: Bank Crisis
Measure  3  Measure  3  1 period  Lagged
Transparency  Transparency  Macro  and
index 13 index  Financial  Var.
Explanatory  dF/dX  dF/dX  dF/dX
Variables  (z-statistics)  (z-statistics)  (z-statistics)
GDP growth  -1.09***  -1.05***  0.26
(-3.97)  (-3.91)  (0.76)
Terms  of Trade  Growth  0.11  0.15  -0.06
(0.94)  (1.28)  (-0.39)
Real Interest  Rate  0.00  0.00  -0.03
(0.63)  (0.56)  (-1.17)
Inflation  Rate  0.00  0.00  0.03*
(-0.39)  (-0.24)  (1.82)
M2/Foreign  Exchange  Reserves  0.19  0.22*  0.32*
(1.50)  (1.77)  (1.94)
Private  Credit  as % of GDP  0.04  0.05  0.02
(1.14)  (1.62)  (0.60)
Bank Cash and Reserves/Assets  0.12  0.13  0.08
(1.14)  (1.22)  (0.74)
2 Period Lagged  Credit Growth  0.00  0.00  0.01
(-0.37)  (-0.23)  (0.81)
GDP per Capita  -0.00**  -0.o0**  -0.00*
(-2.12)  (-2.44)  (-1.29)
Transparency  -1.09  7.44  6.57
(-0.27)  (1.29)  (1.02)
Financial  Liberalization  in the previous  12.75***  32.08***  26.53***
5 years  (4.66)  (3.73)  (3.23)
Transparency  * Fin Liberalization  in  -15.71**  -15.46*
the previous  5 years  (-2.03)  (-1.72)
Number  of Observations  462  462  444
Log Likelihood  -100  -97  -105
***SSignificant  at 1%
**Significant at 5 %
* Significant at 10%
13 Data  source  is  Worfd  competitiveness  report  (WCY).
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